NetBouncer: Active Device and Link Failure Localization in Data Center Networks

Presented by Akash Kulkarni

Problems that may occur in Data Center

- Routing misconfigurations
- Network device hardware failures
- Network device software bugs
- Gray Failures (subtle or partial malfunctions):
 - Drop packets probabilistically (can not be detected by evaluating connectivity)

Problems in Traditional Failure Localization System


- 1. Traditional Systems which query switches for packet loss are unable to observe gray failures.
- 2. Previous Systems need special hardware support, for eg, tweaking standard bits on network packets making it unable to be readily deployed.
- 3. Some prior systems can only pinpoint a region which has the failures. Extra efforts to discover actual error.

Failure Localization System must satisfy three requirements

- 1. Failure localization system needs an end-host's perspective.
- 2. Should be readily deployable in practice compatible with hardware, existing software stack and networking protocols.
- Localizing failures should be precise and accurate (pinpointing towards link or device failures). Should incur less false positives and false negatives.

NetBouncer introduces:

- Efficient and compatible path probing method
- A probing plan to distinguish device failures
- A link failure inference algorithm




Clos network

Probing Plan


- Probing scheme should satisfy two requirements:
 - 1. Pinpoint the routing path of probing packets
 - 2. Consume less network resources such as bandwidth.

NetBouncer's Path Probing via Packet Bouncing



- Because the target network is Clos Network:
 - 1. Minimizes number of IP-in-IP headers (because less and smart connections)
 - 2. Links are evaluated bidirectionally allowing the graph to be undirected.
 - 3. Sender and receiver are on the same server less complicated.

NetBouncer workflow



Mathematical Notations

- Each link has a success probability, denoted by x_i for the i^{th} link.
- Path success probability of j^{th} path , denoted by y_j , described as

 $y_j = \prod_{i: \text{ link}_i \in \text{path}_j} x_i, \forall j,$

- Data inconsistency
 - Imperfect measurements
 - Accidental packet loss
- Latent factor model

minimize
$$\sum_{j} (y_j - \prod_{i:\text{link}_i \in \text{path}_j} x_i)^2 + \lambda \sum_{i} x_i (1 - x_i)$$
subject to $0 \le x_i \le 1, \forall i$

Algorithm running on NetBouncer's Processor

Define:

devs: all devices

 $Y: path \rightarrow [0,1]$ // a map from a path to its success probability

1: **procedure** PROCESSOR()

2: (1) Collect probing data from agents as Y

3: (2) $badDev \leftarrow DETECTBADDEVICES(Y) // line 9$

4: // eliminate the unsolvable subgraph

5: (3) $Y \leftarrow Y \setminus \{ path_r \mid path_r passes any device in$ *badDev \}*

6: (4) $badLink \leftarrow DETECTBADLINKS(Y) // in Figure 5, §5.2$

7: **return** *badDev*,*badLink*

8:

9: **procedure** DETECTBADDEVICES(Y)

10: $badDev \leftarrow \{\}$

11: **for** dev_p in *devs* :

12: $goodPath \leftarrow False$

13: **for** all path_{*q*} passes dev_{*p*} :

14: **If** $Y[\text{path}_{a}] = 1$ **then** $goodPath \leftarrow$ True; break

15: **If** not *goodPath* **then** $badDev + = dev_p$

16: **return** badDev

Algorithm running on NetBouncer's Processor


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Define:
X \leftarrow all x_i, \quad Y \leftarrow all y_i
f(X,Y) \leftarrow \sum_{j} (y_j - \prod_{i: \text{link}_i \in \text{path}_i} x_i)^2 + \lambda \sum_{i} x_i (1 - x_i)
 1: procedure DETECTBADLINKS(Y)
 2:
          X \leftarrow \text{INITLINKPROBABILITY}(Y)
                                                             // line 12
                               // initial value for target function f
          L_0 \leftarrow f(X,Y)
 3:
          for iteration k = 1, \dots, MaxLoop:
 4:
               for each x_i in X :
 5:
                    x_i \leftarrow argmin f(X,Y)
 6:
                              x_i
                    project x_i to [0,1]
 7:
       L_k \leftarrow f(X,Y)
 8:
              If L_{k-1} - L_k < \varepsilon then break the loop
 9:
          return \{(i,x_i)|x_i \leq bad link threshold\}
10:
11:
12: procedure INITLINKPROBABILITY(Y)
          X \leftarrow \{\}
13:
          for link<sub>i</sub> in links :
14:
              // initialize link success probability
15:
              x_i \leftarrow avg(\{y_i \mid \text{link}_i \in \text{path}_i\})
16:
          return X
17:
```

Implementation

- Controller:
 - Takes network topology as input and generates probing plan.
 - Plan contains number of packets to send, packet size, UDP source destination port, probe frequency, TTL etc
- Agent:
 - Fetches probing plan from Controller which contains the paths to be probed.
 - Generates record containing path, packet length, total number of packets sent, number of packet drops, RTTs etc.
 - CPU and traffic delays are negligible because of IP-in-IP technique.


Implementation

- Processor:
 - Front End: collects records from agent.
 - Back End: runs detection algorithm.
- Result verification and visualization tool:
 - Shows packet drop history of detected links for visualization.



Observations

- NetBouncer's probing plan achieves the same performance as hopby-hop probing plan while it remarkably reduces the number of paths to be probed.
- Time to detection for failures < 60 seconds.



Observations

Table 1: Variance of NetBouncer with setup

Faulty	Hop-b	oy-hop	w/o I	DFD	Cor	nvex	L_1	(λ=0	5)	L	$1 (\lambda = 1)$	1)	I	$L_1 (\lambda =$	2)	NetB	ounce	$r(\lambda=1)$
link%	#FN	#FP	#FN	#FP	#FN	#FP	#FN	#FP	Err	#FN	#FP	Err	#FN	#FP	Err	#FN	#FP	Err
0.1%	0	0	135.3	0	0	46.9	0	48.5	0.01	0	0	0.03	0.3	0	0.14	0	0	0.01
1%	0	0	164.0	0	1.9	522.7	0	81.1	0.07	0	0	0.32	1.1	0	1.41	0	0	0.11
10%	0.6	0	123.3	0	257.6	4.1k	0	695.7	0.91	0.1	0.6	3.80	25.6	0	15.88	0.3	0.2	1.43

Table 2: Comparison of CD and SGD

Table 3: Comparison of	of NetBouncer with	existing schemes
		0

OptMethod	Learning rate	#round	Time(s)
CD	—	4	14.8
SGD-lazy	0.001	145	513.3
SGD-lazy	0.005	45	157.5
SGD-lazy	0.01	161	569.9


Faulty link%	0.1	%	1%	6	10%		
	#FN	#FP	#FN	#FP	#FN	#FP	
NetBouncer	0	0	0	0	0.3	0.2	
deTector (0.6)	187.5	6.0k	215.5	7.2k	204.0	22.8k	
deTector (0.9)	204.5	0.7	191.5	0.4	208.0	21.7	
NetScope (0.1)	0	9.1k	3.0	10.8k	167.5	12.6k	
NetScope (1)	0.3	43.7	10.2	395.5	319.5	3.8k	
NetScope (10)	28.7	6.3	291.5	86.7	2.4k	1.2k	
KDD14	7.8	21.0	76.6	433.2	213.8	3.0k	

Deployment experiences

- Clear improvements:
 - 1. Reduces detection time of gray failures from hours to minutes
 - 2. Deepened understanding of the reasons why packer drops happen silent packer drops, link congestion, link flapping, switch unplanned reboot, packet blackholes etc.


Deployment experience

- Case 1: Spine router gray failure
 - Switch silently dropping packets .
 - Led to packet drops and latency increases.
 - Traditional systems detected end-to-end latency issues.
 - Clear that one or more switches were dropping packets. But which one?
 - NetBouncer detected lossy links.



Deployment experience

- Case 2: Polarized traffic
 - Switch firmware bug polarized traffic load onto a single link
 - NetBouncer observed that the Scavenger traffic was dropped at a probability of 35% causing congestion.



Deployment experience

- Case 3: Miscounting TTL
 - Supposed to be decremented by one though each switch
 - NetBouncer detected that certain set of switches were decrementing by two.
 - Manifests as a "false positive" by misclassifying affected good links as bad.
 - Verified and visualized to realize it was false positive.
 - Further analysis of detected devices and links internal switch firmware bug.

Deployment experiences – failed cases

- DHCP booting failure.
 - Servers could send DHCP DISCOVER packets but could not receive responding DHCP OFFER packets.
 - NetBouncer did not detect packet drops. However, the real problem was caused by NIC.
- Misconfigured switch ACL (ACL filters packet)
 - Packets drop for limited set of IP addresses.
 - NetBouncer scanned wide range of IP addresses so signal detected was weak.
- Firewall rules wrongly applied.

Limitations of NetBouncer

- Assumes probing packets experiences same failures as real applications.
- Does not guarantee zero false positives or negatives.
- Assumes failures are independent (might lead to wrong detection)
- Only detects persistent congestion (depends on the probing frequency)

NetBouncer - running in Microsoft Azure's data centers for three years!

Thank You