CSci 5271
Introduction to Computer Security
Day 2: Intro to Software and OS Security

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Outline

Security as an economic good

- Security is a good thing (for defenders)
- But, must trade off other things to get it
- Rational to not purchase all available
- In the big picture, always a compromise

Risk budgeting with ALE

- Annual loss expected = (loss amount)$\times$(incidence)
- Net risk reduction = ΔALE - (security cost)
- Like with a budget, spreadsheet may not match reality
- Like other cost-benefit analysis, can make trade-offs more explicit

Failure: Displacement activity

Security "syllogism" (attributed to: politicians):

1. We must do something
2. This is something
3. Therefore we must do this.

- Example: airport security
- Example: external vs. internal threats

Failure: Risk compensation

- Some benefits of security are taken back by riskier behavior
- Example: H-Day in Sweden
- We'll return to human factors later

This class's perspective

- We'll mostly ignore management issues
- For this class, maximize security at all costs

Outline

Security risk and management

Some terminology

Logistics intermission

Example security failures

Software security engineering

Vulnerabilities in OS interaction

"Trusted"

- In security, "trusted" is a bad word
- X is trusted: X can break your security
- "Untrusted" = okay if it's evil
- Trusted Computing Base (TCB): minimize

"Trusted" vs. "trustworthy"

- Something you actually should trust is "trustworthy"
- Concise definition of security failure: something trusted is not trustworthy

"Privilege"

- Privilege is the power to take security-relevant actions
- Concise definition of security failure: the adversary gets privilege they shouldn't

3 common privilege levels

1. Administrator/root/OS kernel
2. Regular user of system
3. Evil people on the Internet

3 common privilege levels

1. Administrator/root/OS kernel
   ⇑ Local exploit
2. Regular user of system
   ⇑ Remote exploit
3. Evil people on the Internet

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Posting slides before lecture

- I'll try for 11:59pm on the night before, not guaranteed
- Announcements are most likely to change, recheck after

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Classic buffer overflow

```
char buf[20];
gets(buf);
```

- Vulnerability in `finger` daemon
- Morris worm brought down 1988 Internet (4.3BSD VAXes)

Buffer overflow classification

- Bug: stack buffer overflow
- Attack: return address overwrite
- Consequence: (binary) code injection

Read It Twice (WOOT'12)

- Smart TV (running Linux) only accepts signed apps on USB sticks
1. Check signature on file
2. Install file
- Malicious USB device replaces app between steps
- TV "rooted"/"jailbroken"

Confused deputy compiler

- Compiler writes to billing database
- Compiler can produce debug output to user-specified file
- Specify debug output to billing file, disrupt billing
- How to write policy preventing this?

Leaky intelligence analysts

- 1000s of analysts need to view 1000s of classified documents to do their job
- Can we prevent it if one wants to send them to the Washington Post?
- More than regular access control
- (Reality: many non-technical problems)

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Vulnerabilities are bugs

- Security bugs "just a special case" of bugs
- Like regular bugs, only obscure ones make it through testing
- Key difference:
  - Rare regular bug has limited impact
  - Attackers seek out vulnerability circumstances

Security and quality

- Security correlated with other software quality:
  - Developers understand code well
  - Interactions between modules controlled
  - Well tested

Security and other features

- Security would be much easier if systems were less complex
- But, very few users want that trade-off
- Risk compensation with improvements to development process

Contracts and checks

- Requirement: check X before doing Y
- What function's responsibility is the check?
- Answer embodied in contracts, aka specifications, preconditions and postconditions

Defensive programming

- Analogy: defensive driving
- Don't assume things are right, check
- Inbound: preconditions on arguments
- Outbound: error conditions
- Within reason: some things can't be checked at some places

Outline

Shell code injection

- Don't pass untrusted strings to a command shell
- In C: `system`, `popen`
- `system("cmd $arg1 $arg2")`
- Fix 1: avoid shell
- Fix 2: sanitize data (preferably whitelist)

Shell code injection example

- Benign: `system("cp $arg1 $arg2")`, arg1 = `"file1.txt"`
- Attack: arg1 = `"a b; echo Gotcha"`
- Command: `"cp a b; echo Gotcha file2.txt"`
- Not a complete solution: blacklist `';'`

Bad/missing error handling

- Under what circumstances could each system call fail?
- Careful about rolling back after an error in the middle of a complex operation
- Fail to drop privileges $\Rightarrow$ run untrusted code anyway
- Update file when disk full $\Rightarrow$ truncate

Race conditions

- Two actions in parallel; result depends on which happens first
- Usually attacker racing with you

1. Write secret data to file
2. Restrict read permissions on file

- Many other examples

Classic races: files in `/tmp`

- Temp filenames must already be unique
- But "unguessable" is a stronger requirement
- Unsafe design (`mktemp(3)`): function to return unused name
- Must use `O_EXCL` for real atomicity

TOCTTOU gaps

- Time-of-check (to) time-of-use races
  1. Check it's OK to write to file
  2. Write to file
- Attacker changes the file between steps 1 and 2
- Just get lucky, or use tricks to slow you down

TOCTTOU example

```
int safe_open_file(char *path) {
  int fd = -1;
  struct stat s;
  stat(path, &s)
  if (!S_ISREG(s.st_mode))
    error("only regular files allowed");
  else fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
  return fd;
}
```

TOCTTOU example

```
int safe_open_file(char *path) {
  int fd = -1, res;
  struct stat s;
  res = stat(path, &s)
  if (res || !S_ISREG(s.st_mode))
    error("only regular files allowed");
  else fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
  return fd;
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Changing file references

- With symbolic links
- With hard links
- With changing parent directories

Directory traversal with . .

- Program argument specifies file, found in directory `files`
- What about `files/../../../../etc/passwd`?

Environment variables

- Can influence behavior in unexpected ways
  - `PATH`
  - `LD_LIBRARY_PATH`
  - `IFS`
  - ...
- Also umask, resource limits, current directory

IFS and why it's a problem

- In Unix, splitting a command line into words is the shell's job
  - String → argv array
  - `grep a b c` vs. `grep 'a b' c`
- Choice of separator characters (default space, tab, newline) is configurable
- Exploit `system("/bin/uname")`

Next time

- Bugs particular to low-level (e.g., C) programs