CSci 5271
Introduction to Computer Security
Day 12: OS security: higher assurance

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Outline

OS trust and assurance

Announcements intermission

Trusted and trustworthy

- Part of your system is trusted if its failure can break your security
- Thus, OS is almost always trusted
- Real question: is it trustworthy?
- Distinction not universally observed: trusted boot, Trusted Solaris, etc.

Trusted (I/O) path

- How do you know you're talking to the right software?
- And no one is sniffing the data?
- Example: Trojan login screen
  - Or worse: unlock screensaver with root password
  - Origin of "Press Ctrl-Alt-Del to log in"

Minimizing trust

- Kernel → microkernel → nanokernel
- Reference monitor concept
- TCB size: measured relative to a policy goal
- Reference monitor ⊆ TCB
 - But hard to build monitor for all goals

How to gain assurance

- Use for a long time
- Testing
- Code / design review
- Third-party certification
- Formal methods / proof

Evaluation / certification

- Testing and review performed by an independent party
- Goal: separate incentives, separate accountability
- Compare with financial auditing
- Watch out for: form over substance, misplaced incentives

Orange book OS evaluation

- Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
- D. Minimal protection
- C. Discretionary protection
  - C2 adds, e.g., secure audit over C1
- B. Mandatory protection
  - B1<B2<B3: stricter classic MLS
- A. Verified protection

Common Criteria

- International standard and agreement for IT security certification
- Certification against a *protection profile*, and *evaluation assurance level* EAL 1-7
- Evaluation performed by non-government labs
- Up to EAL 4 automatically cross-recognized

Common Criteria, Anderson's view

- Many profiles don't specify the right things
- OSes evaluated only in unrealistic environments
  - E.g., unpatched Windows XP with no network attacks
- "Corruption, Manipulation, and Inertia"
  - Pernicious innovation: evaluation paid for by vendor
  - Labs beholden to national security apparatus

Formal methods and proof

- Can math come to the rescue?
- Checking design vs. implementation
- Automation possible only with other tradeoffs
  - E.g., bounded size model
- Starting to become possible: machine-checked proof

Proof and complexity

- Formal proof is only feasible for programs that are small and elegant
- If you honestly care about assurance, you want your TCB small and elegant anyway
- Should provability further guide design?

Some hopeful proof results

- seL4 microkernel (SOSP'09 and ongoing)
  - 7.5 kL C, 200 kL proof, 160 bugs fixed, 25 person years
- CompCert C-subset compiler (PLDI'06 and ongoing)
- RockSalt SFI verifier (PLDI'12)

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Note to early readers

- This is the section of the slides most likely to change in the final version
- If class has already happened, make sure you have the latest slides for announcements
- In particular, the BCMTA vulnerability announcement is embargoed